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I. Collective bargaining in Italy seen from a historical perspective * 
1.1 The first symptoms of industrialism: the pre-Fascist period 
A close connection can be established between the origins of labour law and the 
advance of industrialization, a process which began in Italy about fifty years behind 
other West European countries. 1 It was the advance of industrialization, too, which gave 
an impetus to the developent of the industrial relations' system, and its inspiration was 
drawn from the ideology of trade union freedom. 
In Italy, no collective agreement system, worthy of that name, was in existence 
before the so-called Fascist period (1924-43). However, the first signs of collective 
bargaining were visible from the middle of the nineteenth century. These agreements on 
the remuneration of work ("tariff contracts") were negotiated by a coalition or groups of 
workers, together with workers who had not been well organized at the level of the 
individual enterprise. The first collective agreement (convention) was concluded in the 
printing industry, at Torino, in 1848. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, an informal network of conventions 
emerged, especially among those engaged directly in production and manufacture 
(compositors, typographers and farm workers). 2 It was also at the end of the nineteenth 
century that the first national unions were established in various branches of the 
economy (among compositors, typographers, railroad workers, the employees of the 
tobacco monopoly, shipyard workers, the personnel of army arsenals, those engaged in 
some - kind of service industry and even in some top government services). In its ,early 
stages, the Italian trade union movement was influenced by an ideology of a Socialist 
hue and most of its members were industrial workers. A few unions could also be found 
in the agricultural sector, but only at the provincial level. 
At that time, the State's attitude to industrial disputes and trade union freedom 
was usually negative. This was due to the influence on the State's approach of a 
mentality, reflected in the legal regulation as well as in the attitude of the public 
authorities, inspired by a liberalist and individualist ideology, especially in the early 
stages of industrialism. That is to say that the absolute freedom of contract was supposed 
to be the basic principle governing labour relations. The individual labour relations were 
regulated by the general rules of private contracts, and were based on the idea of the 
equal status of the parties. The State had no intention of intervening in labour matters 
and tried to avoid involvement in early industrial conflicts.3 
* Special thanks to Professor Cecilia Assanti director of the "Istituto di diritto del lavoro, Universitá 
degli studi di Trieste", without whose support and tutorship this study would have been impossible: thanks to 
all members of the Trieste University who supported my work. 
C.Assanti:Corso di diritto del lavoro, CEDAM, 1993. p. 1. 
2 B.Veneziani: Italy in A. blum, Int. Handbook of Ind. Rel., London, 1981. p. 303. 
3 T. Treu: Italy in International Enc. for Labour Law and Industrial Relations, ed. in chief R. 
Blanpain, VII, Kluwer,1991. p. 21. 
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The first legal regulation in this context was the Penal Code of Sardinia (1859), 
prohibiting coalitions and collective action as illegal restraints on the freedom of labour 
and as liable to penalization. 4 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the ideology of trade 
union freedom also influenced the development of labour relations, that of industrial 
relations in particular, and contributed to change the attitude of the State to industrial 
action. Thus in 1889 the "Zanardelli Code" permitted freedom of coalition and revoked 
the penal sanctions that had been imposed earlier on strike actions. The first statute 
specifying special procedures for the settlement of labour disputes was drawn up in 
1893. Special tripartite bodies (collegi dei probiviri) were organized as a first attempt to 
promote the solution of industrial conflicts through legistlation. 
The decisions of these bodies, as reflected in their decisions on industrial strife, 
were much more liberal than the decisions given by ordinary courts, so their existence 
can be regarded as an important advance for industrial relations and also as a positive 
development in Italian labour law. 
It has been a peculiarity of the pre-Fascist period in Italy that the first signs of 
industrial democracy made their appearance during that time. A very early form of 
workers' participation or, to put it more precisely, of the protection of workers' interests 
was also coming into being and could be traced back to 1906, when special workers' 
councils (commissioni interne) were set up to represent workers at the plant level. At 
that time, workers were not allowed more than to express their opinion on the activity of 
the enterprise. These councils were recognized in a contract negotiated between the 
ROM union (Federazione Italiana Operai Metalmeccanici) and a big car (automobile) 
company (Itala).5 Later some radical members of the labour movement, inspired by 
Communist ideology, tried to transform the workers' councils into factory councils 
(consigli di fabbrica), as a first attempt to put factories under workers' control. This 
experience, however, did not last longer than two years (1919-20). 
The "collegi dei probiviri" had been active for quite a long time, they existed 
until 1928. By this time the corporative system had already been established by the 
Fascist regime.6 
1.2 The Fascist period (corporations, corporative collective agreements, presence of the 
State in the process of bargaining) 
The so-called Fascist period (1924-43) is by now history for Italian labour law, 
yet in some of the regulation its traces still exist, to this day. What we have in mind here 
is that the survival of a kind of corporative collective agreement is a unique peculiarity 
of Italian labour law. 
The depressing presence of public powers in industrial relations was the main 
feature of the Fascist period, also known under the name of corporative period, because 
of the existence of corporations. The State executive power restricted the possibilities 
for the development of industrial democracy. 
The liberty of organization was formally declared, because the Fascist regime did 
not want to oppose the ILO Conventions, ratified by Italy, extending to the field of trade 
4 See No. 2. p. 304. 
5 See No. 3. p. 22. 
6 See No. 2. p. 304. 
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union freedom.? In fact, the Italian State had recognized only one trade union in each 
sector of the economy, and declared them to be public bodies. The administration of 
these associations was filled with members and followers of the Fascist Party. The 
public trade unions were organized in line with the branches of the economy, i.e. 
agriculture, industry and the "tertiary sector". The field of industry in particular was 
subdivided into further groups. As it was the output produced by the economic branches 
that governed the subdivision into categories, a description and classification of 
commercial goods (merceologia) was made, based on the various sectors of the 
economy, such as chemical engineering, siderurgy, food-processing etc. 
In this way the Fascist Party could ward off the attacks launched against it 
because of its activity and they even took care that the actual formulas of the trade union 
institutions were adopted to legitimate the Fascist political influence upon industrial 
relations. 
The law stipulated that if the unions managed to organize more than ten per cent 
of the members of a certain occupational category, this would provide them with a legal 
status (personalitá giuridica). The protection of interests covered all the workers and 
employers, and was not limited to the members of the unions. The collective agreements 
concluded by the associations had "erga omnes" effect for all the members of a certain 
occupational category. The corporative legal system appointed bargaining units.The 
subdivision into categories was based on the production principle and excluded the trade 
unions organized in individual enterprises, not adhereing to the corporative principle. 
The collective agreements were subjected to a legal regulation which differed from that 
governing the individual employment relationship. The rules prohibited that strike and 
"lock out" should be used as a means of solving industrial conflicts, because the Fascist 
dictatorship wanted and required cooperation between employers and employees and 
would not tolerate any kind of conflict. The Fascist ideology held the opinion that any 
kind of industrial conflict was detrimental to productivity and the national economy in 
general. As an organ for solving these conflicts, a special tribunal (Magistratura del 
lavoro) was set up, with the participation of lawyers and non-professionals as members. 
The decisions of this tribunal had the effect of collective agreements. 
All the institutions mentioned in this chapter were regulated by an Act of 1926, 
amended by an Act of 1934, which established the so-called corporations. 
The collective agreements of the corporative period are still applicable to this 
day in individual employment relations, though their validity is limited to only a small 
number of cases. I have referred to this when speaking of the survival (conservazione) of 
the corporative collective agreement as a peculiarity of Italian labour law. More will be 
said about this problem in Chapter I.3.1 and Chapter 1I.2.1. 
7 See No. 1 . p. 6. 
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1.3 The period leading to the adoption of the Constitution 
1.3.1 Legal background 
After the end of World War II (1945) there was a short period of transition, 
lasting for three years, till the adoption of the Italian Constitution (1948). It was during 
this period that free unionism was rebuilt in a short time. The trade union movement 
became strong and unified (the united COIL (General Confederation of Italian Workers) 
had about six million members. The three major parties (Christian Democrats, 
Communists, Socialists) formed a government coalition, which continued in existence 
until 1947. This government assisted organized labour to obtain freedom of organization 
and bargaining and the right to strike. 
When Italy had been liberated from Fascism (1943), a decree issued by the 
Badoglio government (9 August 1943) 8 abolished the corporations and all the 
institutions of the corporative regime (corporations, Ministry of Corporations), and 
subjected the unions to emergency administration, coopting the actual ex-leaders of the 
pre-fascist unions to the commissioners as leaders, putting the trade union movement 
under their control ("patronage"). This ambiguous situation came to an end in 1944, 
when an order of the Allied military government (No.28) and, a little later, Act 23, 
No.369 of November 1944 dissolved the Fascist unions, lifted the control exercised by 
the "patrons", and proclaimed full trade union freedom. 9 Still, trade unions needed some 
time for laying the foundations of industrial democracy and making new collective 
agreements. The main issue of the period was, whether it was worth while to conserve 
the corporative collective agreements or not. In the end, it was decided to keep them in 
force until democratic collective agreements could be concluded. Consequently, all the 
collective agreements which had been concluded under the Fascist regime, apart from 
subsequent modifications, continued in force. The reason why this course of action was 
found advisable was that it helped to avoid the alternative facing the decision-makers, 
i.e. a situation of lawlessnessness, owing to the lack of legal regulation, for an indefinite 
period of time. 
The adoption of the Italian Constitution (1948) marked a turning point in the 
evolution of the system of industrial relations: although it made possible, to a certain 
extent, the survival of the above-discussed corporative norms, it made way, once and for 
all, for the development of a new type of collective agreement. 
1.3.2. The key passage of the Constitution 
The main provision of the Italian Constitution (1948) 10 dealing with the 
industrial era is Article 39. The aim of this provision has be to introduce the basic 
principle of the freedom of trade union organization into Italian law and to encourage 
the unions to make generally binding collective agreements. The passage concerned is 
the following: "Registered unions, represented as integral units with representation 
proportioned to their membership, may conclude collective labour contracts which will 
8 See No. 3. p. 23. 
9 G. Peru: Diritto del lavoro, Padova, 1991. p. 36. 
10 Codice di diritto del lavoro, Cacucci Editore,G. Giugni, F. Liso, B. Veneziani. 
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be binding for all the persons belonging to the categories to which the contract refers". 11 
The article has been based on the principle of the registration of unions as a means of 
recognizing their legal status. The registration by the State may imply a firm control by 
the State administration over the internal affairs of the trade union movement. This 
passage, however, has never been put into force, for reasons which will be discussed in 
the next point of this chapter. 
1.3.3 Problems arising from Article 39 of the Italian Constitution 
The most important point to be stressed is that Article 39 is a technique for 
restructuring the collective bargaining system, but real life managed to bypass and 
overtake this provision, because powerful interests of the social environment acted 
against its realization. Collective bargaining could be adopted more easily to the radical 
changes that had taken place in the economic and social conditions, than the to rigid 
procedure provided by Article 39. This Article, which had never been put into force, 
provided that registered trade unions could make collective agreements which were 
binding for every member of the categories the agreements referred to. Despite the 
existence of this regulation, no generally valid standards were available before it had 
become possible to loosen the close ties with traditional bargaining levels and issues. 
The adoption of this particular process by the Constitution had the effect that no other 
solution could be chosen. Later even more complex problems resulted from the 
impossibility of putting into force Article 39, among others that it lacked general validity 
and that the contracting parties could not be properly identified, and the problem of 
consent necessary for pluralism also acquired importance. That is the reason why the 
firm level and bargaining at the firm level were gaining increasing importance. The non-
implementation of the rigid procedure provided by Article 39 — a procedure modelled on 
bargaining at a national level and aiming at the extension of collective agreements — 
facilitated the decentralization of bargaining; on the other hand, it was in diametrical 
opposition to the objectives set by the Constitution and the model it suggested. The fact 
that the above-mentioned section of Article 39 of the Constitution has never come into 
force has lead to a situation where trade union freedom could be exercised in more 
elastic forms and over a wider range, and where the legislation intervening in the 
processes could have changing objectives and follow varying trends. 12 
While the central problem was that Art 39 had never come into force, much less 
attention was paid to Art.46 of the Constitution. This article specified that, of the social 
groups expressly named by the Constitution, workers employed in the same plant had to 
be divided into bargaining units based on the branches of production (categories), and 
be registered by these categories. Thus the trade union structure reflected the structure of 
production, unless otherwise provided by the Statute of the Rights of Workers. This 
regulation was liable to make it difficult for the bargaining units to obtain recognition 
for their trade union freedom, or to exercise it, as the way they were organized made it 
easier for the management to assert its influence over them; moreover, it was 
incompatible with the intention of those who found it necessary to elaborate the special 
mechanism of Art. 39 of the Constitution. This provision was made with the not easily 
11 See above. 
12 See No.1. p. 172. 
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identifiable group of non-organized workers or employees in mind, while the plant-level 
collective agreements concerned individual employers and their relationship with their 
employees. 
The aim of focussing on Art.46 has been to point out that various sectors would 
be interested in the modification of Art.39, if it seemed likely to them that it might be 
carried into effect. The issue is still being debated by professors and jurists. 
Art. 39 has given rise to another interesting phenomenon, as well. The trade 
unions constituted on the basis of the principle of trade union freedom as 
constitutionally guaranteed by Art.39, section 1, have immediately proceeded to exercise 
their legal capacity by concluding collective agreements, too. In addition to this, the 
non-implementation of the process laid down in the last section of Art.39, has 
strengthened the effect of section 1, and contributed to extending its competence over a 
much wider range than it could be forseen earlier. This shows that although the model 
may not be in marked contrast with reality, it certainly falls short of its requirements, 
and important matters have remained uncovered by its provisions. 13 Nevertheless, 
reality has managed to break through the contradictions between the two sections of 
Art.39,. of which the first one guaranteed complete trade union freedom, while the 
second one restricted it by maintaining the State's right to registration and by requiring 
from trade unions to conclude collective agreements with definite representation in 
proportion to their membership, but extending its effect to all the workers ("erga omnes" 
effect). 
In fact, the model of collective bargaining the legistlators had in mind in Article 
39 of the Constitution was the so-called pluralist model. The trade unions, however, had 
no intention of adopting this model and this was the main reason why it had never 
entered into force. In fact, the trade unions did not want to make a compromise between 
the democratic "erga omnes" effect of collective bargains and trade union pluralism. 
By way of summary, it should be stressed that the aim of Art. 39 of the 
Constitution was to achieve trade union pluralism with "erga omnes" effect in the field 
of collective bargaining. 
II. Collective agreement models in Italy from the beginning to the present 
The literature of the subject has given a review of the models of Italian collective 
agreements, from the beginning to the agreements of the last seventy years of the history 
of industrial relations, and it seems undisputable that two main types can be 
distinguished quite clearly. 14 
11.1 The corporative model 
It was the corporative legal system that created the trade unions, as public bodies. 
This system did not allow for trade unions to be organized in individual enterprises and 
insisted upon setting up bargaining units, by adopting the principle of dividing the 
14 See No.1. p.180-200. 
13 See above p.175. 
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membership into categories based on the product of their work. The collective 
agreements were made by public bodies representing the interests of both workers and 
employers. These agreements were devised so as to meet the various requirements of the 
individual employment relationship, with a bias to that relationship. Article 2071 of the 
Civil Code provided that the collective agreements had to include the rules needed for 
completing the labour regulation. The rules of the corporative collective agreements had 
a normative character, similar to that of the sources of law. The occupational categories 
were individuated authoratively, through Acts of the public administration. Every 
worker and employer who belonged to an occupational category so indicated by the Acts 
fell under the ruling of the agreements. Workers and employees were grouped into 
occupational categories, on the basis of the activity pursued by their employer. If the 
employer carried on various activities, the respective labour relations were regulated by 
the rules of collective agreements corresponding to the activity performed by the 
employee. The collective agreements, even if they expired, were to continue in effect 
until the new agreement came into force. 
Even in individual labour contracts, between partners who fell into one of the 
categories to which the collective agreements made reference, the rules of the collective 
agreements applied and had to be respected. The different clauses of the individual 
labour contracts, whether these contracts had already been in existence before the 
conclusion of the corporative agreement or had been made following it, were replaced 
by the clauses of the collective agreements, unless they contained special provisions, 
more favourable to the workers, than the specifications of the collective agreement. The 
main peculiarity of the corporative collective agreement systeme was that it included a 
very rigid and mostly static set of rules, prohibiting any real bargaining and keeping the 
actual labour conditions on a substantially low level. 
I1.2 The post-Fascist model. (Collective agreements with subjective limited effect 
regulated by Article 39 of the Italian Constitution) 
The new contractual model of Italian collective bargaining has been the so-called 
"contrattazione di diritto comune", a legal term for which it is rather difficult to find a 
correct English equivalent. "Private law contract" seems to be closest to the right term. 
"Contract without erga omnes effect" or "contract with subjective limited effect" might 
also be used. The peculiarity of this model is its subjective limited effect, i.e. that it 
binds only one of the negotiating partners, the workers, or to put it differently, only one 
side, while the employers are free to negotiate individually, as well. 
A marked progress can be observed in collective bargaining with special 
reference to private law, which has been due to the trade union freedom principle. The 
contents of the agreements are more and more in harmony with international sources, 
along two main lines: concerning effectively representative conferedations, in the first 
case and Autonomous Trade Unions, in the second. 15 
The autonomous definition of the categories was formulated through 
negotiations, at the conference table, and confirmed the market economic arrangement. 
15 See above p.193. 
9 
Then the categories, e.g. the industrial sectors, were subdivided into broad sections, by 
means of inter-confederal agreements ("accordi interconfederali"). 
It was rather difficult to define the enforcing provisions, and for two different 
reasons. The first impulse was to consider the new collective agreements as completely 
alien to the rules directly governing corporative collective agreements and to classify 
them with the rules governing contracts in general (Art.1321 and ff. of the Civil 
Code), 16 giving them the name of collective contracts "di diritto comune". 
Jurisprudence, however, found Article 2077 of the Civil Code 17 applicable and 
also tried to prove, in various ways, that it was unalterable, and deliberately failed to 
refer to the above-mentioned classification of the new collective agreements under Art. 
13211 and ff. of the Civil Code. 18 Yet the attempt was not convincing, for the judges in 
particular. 
By way of summming up the issue, it is worth noting that the collective 
agreements with subjective limited effect developed autonomously in Italy and 
surpassed in efficiency the rigid process provided by Art.39 of the Constitution. 
III. The present forms of collective agreements 
According to the prevailing classification, by types of collective agreements, in 
Italy, four types of agreements are distinguished. The development of the present forms 
began with the the abolition of the trade union structures of the Fascist period, later it 
was also influenced by the fact that Article 39 of the Constitution had never come into 
force, as well as by the immediate effect of trade union freedom, and by the extension of 
the "erga omnes" effect of collective agreements to non-registered trade union members, 
which gave rise to various forms of collective agreements. 
111.1 Collective agreements conluded before the present era, which are still applicable 
(corporative collective agreements) 
At present, the collective agreements of the Fascist period or, at least, the parts 
which have not been replaced or altered, are still applicable. 
Act No.369 of 23 November 1994 abolished the organizational structure of the 
corporative period, but provided that the corporative rules should remain in force. The 
Civil Code classed the corporative rules with the sources of law. The rules were fixed by 
collective agreements, by economy-wide collective agreements, by the collective 
sentences given by the Labour Court and by corporative ordinances. All of this 
regulation had been in force at the time of the adoption of the Constituion; however, 
when the Constitution came into force, the conservation of the above-mentioned 
corporative rules was not in harmony with the mentality inherent in collective 
agreements, therefore these rules have become incompatible with the Constitution. 
Act No. 369 of 23 November 1944 provided that the corporative rules should be 
invalidated and the following modifications be made by passing particular laws which 
16 See No.10. 
17 See above. 
18 See No.10. 
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would legalize the existing collective agreements. In the cases where the existing 
collective agreements regulated matters that had been under the regulation of the former 
corporative collective agreements, the new collective agreements have lessened the 
importance of the old rules. 
Consequently, the corporative collective agreements were not applicable, unless 
their regulation was modified by a new collective agreement, with special reference to 
individual employment relationships. 
It has already been mentioned above that the corporative rules were ranged with 
the sources of law and had an intermediate status between regulation and usage. The 
corporative rules could not "derogate the mandatory rules of law and regulation" (Art. 7, 
Introductory Dispositions of the Civil Code);, however, they could prevail against usage, 
even if it was invalidated by law or regulation, unless otherwise provided for (Art. 8). 
The regulation of this matter raised the issue of the relation between collective 
agreements and laws. According to one opinion, each class of sources included in the 
list in Article 1, Intr.Disp., Civil Code fixed minimum conditions amd the lower source 
cannot alter these conditions, unless it is an improvement for the workers, it is in their 
favour. Some jurists, 19 however, are not inclined to agree with the principle of applying 
the source which is more favourable to the workers. It is very difficult to define exactly 
what is favourable to workers, especially when provisions made by a law or in a contract 
have to be compared. 
The practical relevance of corporative collective agreements has been 
diminishing rapidly and is by now confined to marginal categories of workers, not 
covered by any other agreement, and to a very narrow range of items. 
111.2 Collective agreements that trade unions are entitled to conclude 
This type of collective agreement is concluded in accordance with the principle 
of trade union freedom and that of the freedom of organization. This kind of collective 
bargaining is the pivot of the Italian collective bargaining system. These bargains can be 
negotiated by the unions and the employers and are binding for both parties. 
When discussing such terms as the parties to, the levels, personal effects, 
duration, form and structure of the collective agreements in the following chapters, it is 
this type of collective agreement which will be examined, because, at present, this is the 
only form of collective agreement which can be concluded by trade unions and carries 
guarantees for both parties. 
111.3 Collective agreements incorporated in special statutes 
This type of collective agreement is recognized in delegated legislation, issued in 
harmony with the law of delegation, Act No.471 of 14 July 1959, 20 which has recently 
become generally binding, in an indirect fashion. By the end of the fifties, it was 
generally and strongly felt that the fact that collective agreements had no general effect 
19 As Cecilia Assanti in "Corso di diritto del lavoro". 
20 See No. 10. 
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caused problems, and a solution was found by taking into consideration Art. 39 of the 
Constitution, which had forbidden the adoption of proceedings that differed from the 
one it provided. In order to fill the above-mentioned gap, Act No. 741, of 14 July 1959 
and Act No. 1027, of 1 October 1960 were passed. The first Act authorized the 
Government to pass a number of delegated laws, conforming to all the clauses of 
individual collective agreements and of agreements already in existence up to the day, 
when the Act entered in force and registered by one of the signing associations at the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security. 
The purpose of this law was to assure a compulsory minimum level of economic 
and normative conditions governing remuneration and other aspects of labour relations, 
such as promotions, holidays etc., for all the employees, the same minimum applied to 
each member of the same occupational category. 
The delegated laws automatically replaced the economic and normative 
conditions in force, i.e. the parts that were less favourable to workers than the new 
regulation. The previous conditions had continued to be valid until they were modified 
by sources with an "erga omnes" effect. However, it was possible to invalidate them by 
concluding individual labour contracts or by modifying existing collective agreements. 
At first, the delegation was to have a duration of one year and concerned 
previously signed collective agreements alone. The second law, Act 1027, of 1 October 
1960, however, extended the term by fifteen months and declared that its competence 
was also to be extended to agreements concluded up to ten months after the coming into 
effect of the first law. Nevertheless, the Italian Constitutional Court found the extension 
of the second term, extending the competence of the delegation, illegal. 
The problem of the constitutional legitimacy of the two laws may currently 
become of interest again, because it is to be supposed that the solution offered by the 
two laws will be repealed again. In fact, the Constitutional Court has declared that the 
powers given to the Government were to be considered exceptional, and as a temporary 
solution. If that formula is re-proposed, great caution will have to be shown, particularly 
if it is to have general effect. 
Under the influence of the delegated laws without corrective, the regulation of 
labour relations can become quite rigid, specifically for those not organized in unions, 
while the bargaining by organized labour may undergo important changes. 21 There are 
some other ways of applying collective agreements to non-organized workers. These 
will be discussed in Chapter VII. 
111.4 Collective agreements with "ergo omnes" effect 
This type of collective agreement, which is generally binding and is concluded in 
accordance with Art. 39 of the Italian Constitution, cannot come into being, for the time 
being, because of the lack of legislation allowing the implementation of the 
constitutional provision. This situation is of great interest and is peculiar to the Italian 
industrial relations system. To put it more clearly, a constitutional provision cannot be 
enforced, because it acts against some powerful social interest, against trade union 
liberty in particular, which is also guaranteed by the Constitution. Despite this state of 
21 See No.1. p. 181. 
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affairs, it cannot be claimed that this type of collective agreement is only a "nominal" 
arrangement, a mere shadow. At least one important right has resulted from it: it is not 
possible to give "erga omnes" effect to any collective agreement without taking into 
consideration this particular provision (concerning representation, registered unions 
etc.). This is the only constitutional way of concluding collective agreements with "erga 
omnes" effect, and it can prevent the arbitrary extension of the effect of any collective 
agreement, owing to the fact that Art.39 forbids the adoption of the proceedings which 
are not in agreement with its provisions. 
IV. The partners to the collective negotiations 
It has already been mentioned above that the need for collective agreements with 
general effect began to be felt from the early sixties, though the intensity of this feeling 
showed important fluctuations over the time, and the issues of how to identify the 
parthners correctly and of the consent necessary for pluralism have also gained in 
importance.22 
What the negotiating parties should decide first is "for whom, on whose behalf 
they are negotiating", considering that the negotiating competence is limited to the 
categories into which the union membership is organized. Still, convenience and the 
power relations may offer them some opportunities for making choices. 
The partners negotiating collective agreements are workers' organizations, in fact 
the trade unions, on the one hand, and employers or employers' organizations, on the 
other hand. The two partners' positions are not equal, and this is confirmed by Art. 39 of 
the Constitution, because the workers can only negotiate as a "collective", through their 
organizations, while the employers can negotiate as individuals as well, on their own 
behalf. It is worth noting, however, that the collective nature of this relationship is not 
quite clear, because the partners entering into collective relations should have a 
collective status. 
On the workers' side, it is highly important to decide the proportion of 
participation in the negotiating process, taking into consideration trade union freedom 
and trade union pluralism. Despite the fact that there is a provision about representation 
in Art.39 of the Constitution ("Registered unions, represented as integral units, with 
representation proportioned to their membership, may conclude collective labour 
contracts ..."), no regulation existed on how to set the actual rules of representation until 
the promulgation of the Workers' Statute (Statuto dei diritti dei lavoratori), Act No.3, of 
20 May 1970.23 
IV.1 Workers' organizations. Trade unions 
The number of employees in Italy amounts to more than twenty-three millions, of 
which more than fifteen million employees can be considered as prospective union 
members and about ten million people are actually members of the most important 
22 See No.1. p.182. 
23 See No.10. 
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confederations. 24 As compared to other West European contries, the rate of trade union 
organization is somewhat above the average in Italy. The confederations are authorized 
to make statements on behalf of all of the workers, organized as well as not organized, 
and these statements are accepted by both the management and the Government. But as 
regards the most traditional trade union right, the right of concluding collective bargains, 
the unions' authority to make collective bargains with "erga omnes" effect is assured by 
the Constitution alone. The reason why it has to be so is the lack of legislation, which 
tends to limit the validity of the bargains to the members of the unions that are partners 
in an agreement. 
The trade union structure is organized on an industry-wide basis, vertically and 
horizontally. Vertically, the structure is a reflection of the division of the industry into 
branches of production, and groups the industrial federations by occupational categories. 
Horizontally, the structure follows the pattern of geographic areas. Traditionally, 
organized labour in Italy has been divided into three major confederations, along 
ideological and political lines, in the following order of importance: the Italian General 
Confederation of Labour (CGIL), the Italian Confederation of Workers' Unions (CISL) 
and the Italian Workers' Union (UIL). The COIL is composed of a Communist majority, 
a Socialist minority and a number of members who are politically non-aligned. The 
CISL is traditionally a grouping of Catholic workers, it is aligned politically with the 
Christian Democratic Party, yet in recent years the number of its politically non-
committed members increased considerably. The UIL is a non-Communist lay 
organisation of Socialists, with a minority of Social Democrats and Republicans.25 
Unions represent both union and non-union workers, when protecting workers' 
interests, because the benefits obtained by the unions are extended to both organized and 
nori=organized employees. Therefore, many workers have no interest in joining the 
unions. The Italian law does not require from workers to join unions and the "closed 
shop" practice is considered to be illegal. It could be argued that the majority of Italian 
workers take the improvements obtained for them by the unions for granted. 
There are some independent trade unions in Italy, too. These are often craft or 
occupational unions.26 The autonomous unions have the strongest position in the public 
sector, they represent teachers, civil servants on a national scale, custom officers, 
employees in the national health service and railway workers. It is not possible to give 
exact figures and data concerning their membership, structure and organization. 
By way of conclusion, the organizations of senior and middle managers should 
also be mentioned. The professional associations of the middle management are 
different in character from the workers' unions. Their membership is still quite limited in 
number and it has not been clearly defined up to now either, who falls within their scope 
of representation and whose unions they are.. They have not concluded any collective 
agreement up to now, and their representation is not assured in colllective agreements. 
In recent years, a new rank-and-file union organization has come into being, the 
"Cobas",27 composed of highly skilled workers, grouped by firms and industrial 
24 M. Biagi: Employee representational participation in Italy, in Comp. Labour Law Journal, vol.15, 
1994, 303. p. 155. 
25 See above p. 156. 
26 G. Giugni: Recent trends in collective bargaining in Italy in International Labour Law Rewiew, 
vol. 123, 1984, 599. p. 601. 
27 See No. 24. p. 156. 
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branches, and this organization has managed to gain power at the shop-floor level. It has 
strong positions in the railway and educational sectors. It is opposed to traditional 
unions, which represent workers' interests in general, and are under the powerful 
influence of political parties, when it comes to issues connected with national economic 
policy. 
The "Cobas" may want to pursue union activiy without political orientation, but 
in fact the protection of workers' interests cannot be separated from the political 
environment and workers as the individual subjects of industrial relations constitute a 
complex collective personality, showing various, often disparate interests and 
orientation. 
It must be kept in mind that the main purpose of trade union activity is the 
protection of workers' interests, but there is more to it than that. 
IV.2 Employer(s) or employer(s)' organizations 
On the employers' side, either individual employers or employers' organizations 
can be seen to participate in negotiations. There are also a number of enterprise 
associations in the industrial sector in Italy. The most important employers' association 
is the Confindustria (Industrial Confederation) with some industry-wide or territorial 
associations as members. It represents the interests of more than 100.000 industrial 
enterprises, but most of these are very small ones, employing less than one hundred 
workers.28 The Confindustria is the largest and most powerful employers' association in 
Italy, has no close connections with any political parties, yet it exercises a strong 
influence upon the nation's political and economic life. The enterprises in the public 
sector have their own associations, such as Intersind or ASAP, but their activity does not 
extend beyond the conclusion of collective bargains, while Confindustria protects and 
promotes the interests of its members in the domains of both industrial relations and of 
general economic policy. 29 
Private employers also have some organisations for representing their collective 
interests, Confcommercio and Confesercenti in the commercial sector, Confagricoltura 
in agriculture, Assicredito in the banking and credit sector, and Confapi for the small 
firms. The above-mentioned organizations represent the management's interests in 
labour management relations and in collective negotiations, on different levels, i.e. on 
the provincial, regional or national level. 
Compared to the workers' side, unlike the workers' organizations, the employers' 
associations have no strong political orientation and their activity is limited to settling 
industrial disputes and collective bargaining (with the exception of Confindustria). Seen 
from this perspective, their industrial activity is much more closely connected to their 
professional activity than that of the workers' asssociations, whose main concern is the 
protection of interests. 
28 See above p.157. 
29 See No. 26. p. 604. 
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N.3 The presence of the State (public authorities) in the system of collective 
negotiations 
The State's presence in collective negotiations seems to indicate an obvious lack 
of collective relations. In Italy, the State is present in the three-sided agreements on the 
national level, which will be discussed in Chapter X. These play an important part in 
industrial relations, but bargains made on the national level could be called only 
gentlemen's agreements, involving no legal obligations. It is only in trilateral agreements 
that the State is in a position of direct partnership, but its indirect presence and impact 
can be felt in the collective agreements, too. In some cases, the State's presence can be a 
highly important factor. The implications of State presence are the following: First, it is 
mainly in democratic industrial systems, where the partners have a genuine intention of 
abiding by the gentlemen's agreements, that trilateral agreeements can have an influence 
on collective negotiations. Secondly, if the partners involved in the collective 
agreements are not able to agree on the disputed matters, they can call on the State to 
assist them to come to an agreement. The State usually tries to help through one of the 
Ministries, but it is not in a partner's position, though its presence is important, and plays 
the part of an intermediary. Finally, the strongest presence of the public authority in the 
collective agreements is made possible through legal regulation. 
The system of industrial relations is not highly regulated in Italy. In Hungary, the 
regulation is rigid and goes into great detail, which is not favourable to industrial 
freedom. The Hungarian regulation, even if its purpose is to help, functions like a spiral 
movement accelerated by its own momentum. 
An unprecedented State intervention into industrial freedom in Italy was Act.300, 
of 20 May 1970, named the Workers' Statute (Statuto dei lavoratori), 30 which 
contained provisions for the protection of workers' freedom and dignity, for trade union 
freedom and freedom of action within the workplace, and provisions for placement. The 
Act is meant to be the basic source of the legal protection of trade union freedom in 
Italy, stating more precisely and clearly what Section 1 of Art.39 of the Constitution 
declared earlier: "The trade union organization is free" (L'organizzazione sindacale é 
libera).31 Art. 14 of the Workers' Statute grants to "every worker" the "right to form 
trade unions, to join them, and to take part in union activity". It makes provisions for the 
exercise of this right "within the workplaces". It is worth noting, in connection with 
Hungarian experiences, that the latter right is not necessarily favourable to trade union 
freedom. During the codification of the Hungarian Labour Code, there was some 
discussion about whether it the Code should guarantee union activity within the 
workplace or not. It is true that such a provision makes it easier to pursue trade union 
activity there, however, trade union officials have to work subordinated to employers, in 
their individual labour relations, and subjected to the power relationships prevailing in 
the workplace and this is a situation which may hinder their freedom of action in such 
cases, when they must oppose the demands of the employer, in order to protect the 
employees' interest. A great variety of negative experiences can be found in Hungary to 
illustrate this view. 
30 See No.10. 
31 See above. 
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Returning to the Workers' Statute, it contains an important discriminatory act and 
a detailed regulation of how to establish workers' unions (rappresentanze). In the course 
of time it has become its main purpose to give legal expression to industrial realities. 32 
V. The levels of collective negotiations 
In the course of the development of the new bargaining model in Italy, the 
importance of the various levels of collective bargaining has undergone a change. 
The interconfederal bargaining for large sectors of the economy or for the entire 
industry played a key role in the period of the post-war reconstruction and in times of 
recession, because it guaranteed minimum working conditions for workers employed in 
broad sectors of the economy. 33 
During the 1960s, and especially the 1970s, the national, industry-wide 
agreements performed an essential role in deciding questions such as the remnuneration, 
the problems of work organization, working conditions, working hours and trade-union 
rights.34 
The significance of firm-level agreements was especially great between 1968 and 
1970. From 1974 on, the importance of the plant-level bargaining had diminished 
progressively, but the Protocollo... of 1993 brought favourable changes at this level 
again. 
As to the present, an evening out of the different contractual levels can be 
observed now. This has contributed to a more balanced distribution of the agreements 
among the different contractual levels, which, in its turn, gave rise to a complex 
contractual network. 
V.1 Confederational level (Confederazione) 
The Confederation is a complex association, in a horizontal as well as in a 
vertical position, it can make agreements within the limits. of the statutory regulation of 
competences, and these are applicable to the associates of member associations, too. 
These are the so-called "accordi interconfederali". The interconfederational bargainings 
are very wide in scope, cover all the manufacturing industries and, indirectly, some other 
branches of industry, too. Following the example of the former bargains, they 
incorporate the issues, upon which there had been former agreements. These agreements 
have been concluded at varying intervals and refer to wages, the labour market and to 
the actual employment policy, in particular.35 
33 M. Biagi: Recession and the Labour market:training for flexibility, in Comp.Labour law Journal, 
vol.15, 1994, p. 305. 
34 G. Guigni: Juridification of Italian Labour Relations in Comp. Labour Law Journal, vol. 8, 1987, 
309. p. 318. 
35 See No. 26. p. 600. 
32 Wedderburn: Employment rights in Britain and Europa, London, 1991. p. 236. 
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V.2 Federational level (Federazione) 
The Federation (Federazione) is a national association with vertical connections, 
i.e. including all the territorial associations of the same occupational category. The 
Federation can negotiate — with reference to the same fundamental criterion, and in its 
own field — collective agreements applicable to the territorial associations, which are its 
members. 
The national industry-wide agreements have considerable importance for the 
Italian system of industrial relations. This kind of agreement played an essential role 
during the 1960s and especially in the early 1970s. 
V.3 Provincial level (Associazione provinciale di categoria) 
The provincial association of occupational categories has negotiating competence 
in its own territory (province). Some of these agreements made by it do not cover the 
whole province, and a great number of its agreements cover one firm alone. This kind of 
agreement can often be found in the agricultural or construction sector. 
The Association can also negotiate on behalf of the employees of a field which is 
narrower than its official sphere of action. A case in point is that the Confederations 
concluded agreements for the industrial sector. This is a highly important point, 
indicating how Art.39 of the Constitution, last section is implemented in practice. It 
should be mentioned that this section contains no requirements for structuring the 
categories of the associations, their negotiating competence is enough for making 
agreements. 36  (Moreover, in this way, they can ignore and get round the representation 
organized along vertical lines.) 
V.4 Firm level (Contratti aziendali)37 
The development of company collective agreements has raised new problems 
lately, particularly with reference to the modification of Art.39 of the Constitution.38 
This kind of collective agreement, covering an entire company, has become quite 
common by now. There are some bargainings, the scope of which extends to a group of 
companies, with activities in several branches, or to a holding company, but it is rare 
now for bargaining to occur at the shop level.39 
The first experiences of company collective agreements were gained from the 
agreements concluded by the "commissioni interne", in 1943. These bodies were elected 
by the entire community of workers in a company. Despite the fact that they were not 
authorized, by the agreements that set them up, to make collective agreements, in actual 
fact, they concluded a great number of collective agreements between the years 1943 
36 See No 1. p. 193. 
37 S. Sciarra: Plant bargaining: the impact of Juridification on current deregulative trends in Italy , 
in Comp. Labour Law Journal, vol. 8, 1987. p.123-125. 
38 See No. 1. p. 194. 
39 See No. 26. p. 605. 
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and 1966. These agreements have raised a complex question. According to an opinion, 40 
these agreements are to be considered as statements by the employer, adressed to the 
employees, and are also extending to the workers employed subsequently. The fact that 
the workers "agree" with the employer's statement can be be given the interpretation that 
the employers "have made an agreement with the employer" and, to carry it a step 
further, can be seen as the completion of a kind of transaction, though it is clearly not a 
contract. 
Jurisprudence declared the agreements concluded by the "commissioni interne" 
to be collective agreements. 
A second series of expriences of company collective agreements were collected 
in the years between 1962 and 1963, and did not raise any problem. 
The third stage in the development of firm collective agreements fell to the early 
1970s. The Workers' Statute (Statuto dei levoratori), Act No.300, of 20 July 1970, 
provided for collective agreements at the plant level in Articles 4 and 6. 
Article 4 prohibits the use of audiovisual equipment and any other equipment for 
monitoring the workers' activity. The Act allows the installation only in case if the 
organization and productive exigences or the safety of the work should require it. 
Nevertheless, the equipment must be placed at a distance from the workers' activity. The 
possibility and the conditions of the control must be regulated in the collective 
agreements concluded by the the employer and the company unions (rappresentanze 
sindacali aziendali) or, in the absence of company unions, by the "commissioni interne". 
If there is no collective agreement between the employer and the employees, at the 
request of the employer, the Department of Labour is entitled to decide the matter. 41 
Article 6 prohibits the bodily search of the workers, except for cases of 
emergency, and when company property needs to be protected. In these cases, it is 
permissible to make bodily searches at the exit of the workplace, by using an automatic 
selection system. The cases when search is permitted and the way it is done must be 
fixed in advance, in the agreement between the employer and the company unions, or in 
the absence of an agreement, at the request of the employer, the Department of Labour 
can grant authorization.42 
The issues raised by the above are the following: First, have the company 
collective agreements, provided for in Art. 4 and 6, general effect? The question can be 
answered, by keeping it in mind that, in these cases, the collective agreements regulate 
indivisible matters (materia indivisibile), and their sole concern is to serve the firm's 
organizational and operational needs and requirements, which makes it impossible that 
these could be agreements between contrasting interests. These questions must be 
regulated in such terms which presuppose a unity of interests between the parties, they 
must extend to all the workers and must have general effect. 
Secondly, do these two articles invalidate Article 39 of the Constitution, in which 
the subjects that can be stipulated in collective agreements are set out? The answer is no, 
because it is not Art. 39 of the Constitution, which is involved, but Art. 46. If the matter 
is indivisible, all the company unions need to consent. 
The Workers' Statute, of 1970, charged the firm-level collective agreements with 
an important new function, they had to decide in the questions of the "cassa 
40 See No.1. p. 197. 
41 See No. 10. 
42 See No. 32. p. 238. 
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integrazione guadagni", of the equality of opportunity between male and female 
employees, of the transfer of the firm in case of crisis, of the authorization to conclude 
fixed-term individual labour contracts, of the reduction of working hours and wages. 
Viz. in the above matters, the law does not contain clear indications and provisions as to 
what should be included in and regulated by the collective agreements. In case of 
indivisibility, all the common subjects included in Art. 19 of the Workers' Statutes need 
consent. If the matter is divisible, keeping in mind that, in this case, it is Art. 46 of the 
Constitution which is involved, and not Art. 39 of the Constitution, the need for the 
consent of either all of the representative company unions or that of most of the workers 
will depend on what is required by the Italian model of democracy. It is worth noting, 
however, that the matter is very often indivisible. 43 
Changing to another subject, namely to who the partners are in plant-level 
collective agreements, 44 it can be observed that, in this case, the management of the 
enterprise and the "commissioni interne" or the workers' concil ("consiglio di fabbrica") 
have been the bargaining agents. The Statue of Workers (1970) established a new 
institution on the workers' side of the negotiations, called RSA (rappresentanze 
sindacali aciendali). The RSA was the most representative union of the enterprise 
organization.45 Nevertheless, the most widespread form of representation at the firm 
level was the workers' council, representing the interests of all the workers, whether 
organized or non-organized. From 1991 on, another form of employee representation 
has come into being at the company level, called "united representation of the union" 
(rappresentanze sindacali unitarie, RSU), established through an agreement between 
the CGIL, the CISL and the UIL. The pact provided that the RSUs be elected by secret 
ballot in the workplace and had to subject themselves to competition from other trade 
union bodies, not affiliated with the CGIL, the CISL or the UIL. All eligible workers, 
including non-organized employees, were entitled to vote. 
More recently, the 1993 agreement (Protocollo triangolare 23 luglio) provided 
that one third of the RSU members be "either designated or elected by those labour 
organizations which had taken part in the negotiations (rather than by the signatory 
organizations) and by those presenting electoral lists, proportionally to the casted 
votes".46 According to the Protocollo triangolare..., the RSUs are accredited as 
bargaining agents at the plant or company level, but only if they are- able to link with the 
national unions which negotiated the industry-wide agreement applicable to the plant or 
company. In this way, national and company bargaining is coordinated, according to the 
principle declared by the trilateral agreement, viz. that matters should be differentiated 
between the national level and the plant leve1.47 One of the objectives of the above-
mentioned agreements was to make the structure of the collective agreement system 
more clear and ordered. This subject will be discussed in the following point of this 
chapter. 
44 See No. 24. p. 158. 
46 See No. 10. 
47 See No. 24. p. 160. 
43 See No. 1. p. 194. 
45 See No.32. p. 249. 
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To begin with, it should be stressed that the provisions of the Protocollo... have 
favoured the plant agreements, which had considerable importance in the 1960s and 
1970s, but lost much of this importance in the 1980s and 1990s. 48 
Nevertheless, concluding collective bargains at the plant level has not been an 
undisputable and proper trade union right, and this level has not seemed more entitled to 
making bargains than the others. The "commissioni interne" and the "consiglio di 
fabbrica" have been institutions representing the right of all the personnel of a company 
or workplace to participation. The Workers' Statute attempted to make the situation 
clear by establishing the RSA as the most representative union of the enterprise 
organization, but as already mentioned above, the most widespread form of 
representation at the firm level has been the workers' council, representing the interest of 
all the workers. Recently, the Protocollo triangolare by accrediting the RSUs as 
bargaining agents at the plant level — but only if they were able to link with the national 
unions that bargained the industry-wide agreements applicable to their plant — has not 
helped to clarify the situation. Our opinion is that it would be important to set it down 
clearly in Italy that the right to make collective agreements is a trade union right and it is 
the institution of workers' participation in decision making. But, in the latter case, the 
absence of the institutions of workers' participation over the firm level is bound to be a 
problem. 
V.5 Problems arising from the decentralisation of the collective negotiations 
In the last years, the magic word in connexion with the development of labour 
law was "flexibility". This notion has connexions with decentralization, too. There is an 
opinion, in which in future the plant level will become the most important of the 
bargaining levels, because it is much more flexible than the other levels. 49 Some 
important rules, favourable to firm-level bargaining in Italy, have already been 
mentioned above, the most recent example cited being the Protocollo triangolare... On 
the other hand, bargaining over the firm level is also in a strong position in Italy. Two 
contrasting tendencies are discernible as influences on the process of structuring by 
levels the bargaining. The first tendency is centralisation at the federational level, i.e. a 
tendency to make industry-wide collective agreements. The second tendency is 
decentralization, i.e. shifting the focus towards the firm-level, which means collective 
agreements concluded in the firms. The Protocollo triangolare shows quite clearly the 
influence of both opposing tendencies in the part which refers to the reform of the 
collective bargaining system. Its aim is to set out a new integrated framework for Italian 
industrial relations, and it establishes that there are only two levels of collective 
bargaining. The first level is bargaining over a national collective employment contract 
(contratto collettivo nazionale di lavoro, or CCNL) for each sector, the second level of 
bargaining is either the company level or the territorial (local) level, depending on the 
current practice within each sector. 
The Protocollo has also provided highly important changes in the duration of 
collective agreements. These will be discussed in Chapter VIII. 
48  Central agreement on Incomes Policy and Bargaining Reform in European Industrial Rel. 
REv.,1993 n.236, p. 15. 
4° See No. 34. p. 326-327. 
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As to interpretation, the general rules for contracts are also applied to collective 
agreements. 
Collective agreements are periodically renewed, owing to the obligation to 
negotiate. This obligation is usually of contractual origin and results from the permanent 
relations existing between the parties, better known under the name of industrial 
relations. 51 The above-mentioned characteristics refer to the clearly contractual 
character of the agreements. The problem posed by the relation between collective 
agreements and the law is the following: first, the collective agreements must respect all 
the mandatory (inderogabile) rules of law and they can improve the legal conditions in 
the cases when this is to the benefit (principio di favore) of the workers. Secondly, there 
are no matters (subjects) reserved exclusively for collective agreements. It is difficult to 
share the first opinion, 52 asserting that the collective agreements must respect the 
constitutional principles alone and the enacting laws.The above-outlined situation came 
to a crisis when, following the 1980s, the law specified a compulsory ceiling, which 
could not be exceeded, for some collective agreements. In the opinion of some 
scholars, 53 it is very difficult to compare what the law gives to the workers and what the 
collective agreements manage to achieve for them, and to decide, which is more 
favourable from their point of view. Art.2078 of the Civil Code regulated the relation 
between relevant rules and statutes, and also decreed the application of the principle that 
what was more favourable to workers should have precedence over the legal regulation 
currently in force. 
We agree with the opinion in which it is very difficult to decide, what is more 
favourable to workers, especially when comparing legal norms and contractual 
dispositions. However, we would argue that the application of the principle of the "more 
favourable treatment" is equally important and useful, as a minimum guarantee for the 
workers who are, in fact, not in the position of equality compared to the employers, in 
individual labour relations, because of their subordinate position in the labour 
organization. This also applies to the relation between the law and collective agreement, 
where the stronger position of the employers can be supposed to allow them to dictate a 
regulation, which may be less favourable to the workers than the provisions of the law. 
If the "erga omnes" effect were in force, it would be more difficult for the employers to 
behave so, especially in their relations with organized labour. Still, it is true that the 
principle of the more favourable treatment should be applied with great care and 
caution. The above-analysed issue has also been posed in Hungary, where the principle 
of the treatment in favour of workers was also laid down in statutory regulation, in some 
cases in the Labour Code, but the Court of Constitution declared the application of that 
principle unlawful, with special reference to the application of a rule, fixed in the 
Labour Code: "In issues relating to employment, the trade union shall be entitled to act 
in the interest of, in and on behalf of, the employees, without special authorization" (this 
formulation may imply that the opinion of the employees themselves may be left out of 
consideration). As the Court created a precedent, it may return similar decisions, in 
future as well. 
51 See No. I . p. 189. 
52 See above p. 181. 
53 See No. 1. p. 182. 
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VII. The personal effects (l'efticacia soggetiva) of the collective agreements 
The last section of Art.39 of the Italian Constitution provided that registered 
trade unions, represented by their organizations, could enter into collective agreements 
with compulsory effect, for all the members of the category the agreement referred to. In 
Chapter I.3. it has already been analysed, why this Article has not entered into force. 
The Italian Constitution aimed at constructing a new contractual model for collective 
agreements, with "erga omnes" effect, but incorporated in the text — perhaps as a 
guarantee — the element of State control exercised by the public authority over union 
liberty. 
The actual development of collective bargaining followed a different path than 
the one planned in the Constitution, and has lead to the development of collective 
bargaining under private law or other conventions without "erga omnes" effect, the 
result of which was the so -called "contrattazione collettiva di diritto comune". The 
negotiating competence was limited to occupational categories and to personal 
(subjective) effect, but offered a choice between the two options, on the basis of 
convenience and that of the balance of power between the parties. Thus the occupational 
approach to the problem was confirmed by usage, painfully, through a long process of 
arrangements, the equivalent of which could also be found, as the ILO Conventions 
confirmed it, in the industrialization process of other countries. The personnal effects of 
the collective agreements were also limited, viz. to the members of the contracting 
partner unions. 54 
As time passed, the rule specifying that collective agreements affected only the 
concluding parties and their membership also underwent a modification, owing to the 
reassessment and restructuring of the system of social obligations, among others the 
obligation of the employer towards the opposite party, which was extended to apply to 
all of his employees. (See the decision of the Corte Cassazione, No.4611, of 8 August 
1979). More recently, the reappraisal of the obligation to equality of treatment carried a 
step further the extension, while the necessity of negotiating a new collective 
agreements, because of the adverse effects of the economic crisis had on them, has 
narrowed its range, because the organized people tended to assert their independence of 
non-organized workers. 
It has already been mentioned above that the State attempted to extend the "erga 
omnes" effect of collective agreements by delegated law, but the constitutional 
legitimacy of this procedure has been questionable. The application of collective 
agreements to non-organized workers can also be acheived by other means. It may be 
obtained by a spontaneous adjustment, made by an individual employer, in partnership 
with employees who find that the change is to their advantage. Sometimes it may be 
offered as an incentive, e.g. see Art.39 of Act No.300, of 1970. For some subjects, such 
as the Christmas bonus, a general extension can be obtained, often under Art.1374 and 
Art.2078 of the Civil Code. As to the employees' pay, the collective agreements can also 
be of use in this matter, in application of Art.3 of the Constitution or Art.2099 of the 
Civil Code. Sometimes judges may also refer to collective agreements, e.g. when they 
have to decide on questions of pay, which have not been fixed in the indivudual contract 
54 See above p. 178. 
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or fixed in violation of Art.36 of the Constitions, which refers to the principle of equal 
pay (retribuzione). 55 
VIII. The duration of the collective agreements 
As to the problem of interpretation, the general rules for contracts are applied to 
collective agreements, too, and this applies to their their term of expiry, too. The 
collective agreements can periodically be renewed. This is usually included in the 
obligations laid down in the agreement, on a contractual basis. This obligation derives 
from the permanent nature of the relationship between the negotiating parties.Still, there 
are some rules, inherited from corporative collective agreements, which are still valid. 
E.g. Art. 2074 of the Civil Code provides that the expired collective agreement 
continues to be in force until the new agreement comes into force. 
Whether the above-mentioned Article was suitable to be applied to the new form 
of collective agreements, as supplementary regulation, viz. without the possibility of 
imposing the provision of duration, which falls under the regulation of Art.2071 of the 
Civil Code, was subject to discussion, involving a great variety of interpretations. The 
first anwser to this question was positive, and started from the Article's aptitude to 
assure the connection between the collective agreements, succeeding each other as time 
went on, and to avoid or fill in gaps (see No.3899, 21 April 1988, Corte Cassazione). 
This problem may be of importance for employees joining a trade union after the 
date when the collective agreement was signed, or for employees entering into an 
individual labour contract, while the collective agreement was in force or after its 
expiry, which might affect the employer in a different way than they do the employee. 
Later on, the solution that the employer should apply the above Article not only to the 
associates of the unions but to all his employees has become increasingly popular. 
However, it has always been clear enough that the employer cannot disregard the 
conditions required by the legislation in force, and cannot use the expiry of the 
agreement for the purposes of putting pressure on the negotiating partner and of shaping 
the next agreement at his pleasure. As a matter of fact, when the employers are reluctant 
to apply Art. 2074 of the Civil Code, they must still take into consideration the most 
important social obligations, and it is also rare for a collective agreement not to fix a 
predetermined term of expiry, so the good-faith principle must also be considered, as 
well as the principle which excludes the perpetual validity of compulsory restrictive 
clauses and guarantees the possibility of rescission. 56 
Finally, in connection with the duration of collective agreements, some points of 
the Protocollo triangolare should also be mentioned. These provide that the CCNLs 
(contratto collettivo nazionale di lavoro), for each sector, should'have a duration of two 
years, as far as the arrangements affected remuneration, and a duration of four years 
concerning other matters. A reason why a distinction should be made between the terms 
of duration for remuneration and other matters is that the remuneration package sections 
have to be in harmony with the income policy parameters and with the planned or 
expected inflation rates. As the central agreement puts it: "the dynamics of the economic 
55 See No. 1. p. 179. 
56 See above p. 181. 
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effects of the contract shall be coherent with the planned inflation rate taken as a 
common goal". 57 
Setting a special deadline for wage agreements, which is different from the term 
of expiry of the entire collective agreement, was completely new to the Italian 
bargaining system. 58 
The regulation has provided for the company and territorial agreements to have a 
four year duration, instead of the three they have at present. 
Passing over to the problems of retroactive force (efficacia dopo la scadenza), it 
must be pointed out that the deadlines fixed by Italian contracts have not had a great 
impact on the bargaining process. 59 The agreements were often signed months after the 
expiration of the previous one, and long after the conclusion of the bargain and were 
applied retroactively, if possible, or an alternative was found, i.e. some money was given 
to the employees to compensate them for their losses. The Protocollo...60 provides for a 
new system of wage adjustment for periods falling between collective agreements, called 
"allowance for lack of bargaining". Pending the renewal of the collective agreements, an 
automatic adjustment, equivalent to 30 % of the living-cost index will be applied to 
wages and salaries after three months from the expiration of the previous agreement and 
50 % after six months. The aim of this system is to bring about a fast renewal of the 
collective bargaining system in Italy. 61 
The form and structure of collective agreements 
In harmony with the principle of the freedom to bind contracts (contractual 
liberty), the parties can agree upon the form and structrure of collective agreements 
without any interference from the law. Still, comparing the texts of some collective 
agreements, similarities of structure — deriving from usage — are clearly discernible. 
The only problem that can be posed in this context is, whether there is a need for 
a compulsory written form of the agreement or not. According to an opinion,62 the need 
for giving the written form a probatory (probative) aim arises from the general principles 
of Italian labour law (see Art. 2721 of the "Codice Civile"). 
Consensual agreements at nation-wide leve163 
The consensual agreement is legally binding for the trade unions and the 
enterprises, but not for the government, and does not impose legal obligations on the 
latter ("accordi tripartiti"). They are based on social consensus. Nevertheless, these 
engagements are very important to the social partners. The parties to the trilateral 
agreements are the government, the enterprises and the trade unions. In these 
57 See No. 48. p. 17. 
58 See above. p. 15. 
59 See No. 48. p. 18. 
60 See No. 10. 
61 See No. 33. p. 316. 
62 Cecilia Assanti in "Corso di diritto del lavoro" p. 194. 
63 See No. 48. p. 15-19. 
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agreements, the government accepts engagements which have influence on the collective 
agreements between the enterprises and the trade unions. The Italian trilateral 
agreements are following the practice of other Western democracies where the lefties 
parties take part in the government. 64 
In Italy, trilateral agreements of great imporance were concluded in 1983, in 
1992 and, recently, in 1993. In 1984, some unions (the CISL and the UIL) also 
concluded an agreement, but they did not sign it, and there was a union, the CGIL, 
which was not among the partners. 
The trilateral agreements raise two problems. First, they may put presssure on the 
Parliament, which is in contradiction to the autonomy of the deputies belonging to the 
majority as well as to the autonomy of those belonging to the minority. Secondly, 
trilateral agreements may lead to a collision between the unions and the political parties. 
In spite of the above-mentioned problems, the importance of the trilateral 
agreements has been increasing, and nothing can be done against it. This tendency is 
strengthened by the State's endeavour to participate in the social consensus, even if the 
State's presence disturbed the free development of the agreement between the two main 
actors of the national economy, the employers and the employees. Finally, we would 
argue that the three-sided agreements are not favourable to industrial democracy. 
However, it is not necessary to go into details, because the detailed analysis of the 
problems raised by trilateral agreements falls beyond the scope of this paper. 
XI. The current trends of collective bargaining in Italy 
In former chapters, some reflections have been made on certain aspects of 
collective bargaining and the current trends in Italy. Now a short summing up of the 
subject will be attempted below. 
Since the confederational and federational levels of the collective agreements are 
much less flexible than the agreements made at the enterprise level, the latter agreements 
may lead to great tension because of their greater flexibility, which is much more 
accomodating to economic and social changes. As a result of this state of affairs, the 
plant-level collective agreements play a leading role in the Italian industrial relations 
system. At the same time, an opposing tendency can also be observed to be in action in 
the industrial relation system, a centralised one, and this has a growing importance for 
national industry-wide collective agreements. 
The Protocollo triangolare has tried to éncourage the above two-directional 
tendencies and this may result in a restructuring of the bargaining levels.In future, 
bargaining based on a tripartite relationship may become more and more common, and 
may lead to the strengthening of the neocorporative model or corporative democracy. As 
we have already pointed out, the presence of the State in these agreements is not 
favourable to the autonomous development of industrial democracy, even it is intended 
to promote the social dialogue between the partners and even if the social peace is its 
final objective. 
An important ambition of the State is to extend the "erga omnes" effect of 
collective agreements, in fact, the enforcement of Article 39 of the Italian Constitution. 
64 G. Giugni: Social Concertation and Political system in Italy, in Labour, 1987, 3. p. 63-65. 
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Nevertheless, mention should be made of the fact that, parallel with the State's 
aspiration, there is another important striving, on the part of the trade unions, to preserve 
and protect their independence, first of all from the control and interference of the State. 
This could lead to a situation, where the unions may do their utmost to frustrate the 
coming into force of Article 39. 
The emergence of a new trend can be observed in the regulation of industrial 
relations, which goes into greater detail as the previous ones, especially with regard to 
plant-level collective agreements (in the Protocollo triangolare). In connexion with the 
above-mentioned trends, it should be stressed that Italian industrial relations have not 
been meticulously regulated, going into small details, up to that time. 
This has been a very valuable asset, which should be safeguarded. 
The Protocollo triangolare has also provided for different terms of expiry in the 
same collective agreement, fixing a special deadline for wage agreements, which was 
completely new to the Italian bargaining system. 65 
Another important phenomenon should also be mentioned, the emergence of the 
initial forms of European collective agreements. The highest national level of the 
collective bargaining is bound to become the first level of decentralized European 
bargaining, which will tend to make the process of arriving at a consent even more 
complex.66 
The above-mentioned trends are characteristic features which might have strong 
influence on the future development of Italian labour law in the field of industrial 
relations. 
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